Chapter II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

In this research, the writer believes that she needs to base her study on some related theories. Thus, she provides some related theories to guide her in analyzing the collected data before drawing any conclusion.

2.1 Review of Related Theories

According to Bloomfield (1965, p.142), a person uses language to express the ideas, feelings or volitions. On the other hand, one uses language to express his or her complete thought in his or her brain. More over, as Krapp (1965, p.156), if the person has the ability to express himself or herself clearly and forcibly in language he or she, unconsciously, makes the interaction proceed because the listener will get the message clearly and easily. The writer is of the opinion that it is important to know the illocutionary force of an utterance and the listener's interpretation, to accomplish the success of an interaction.

2.1.1 Speech Act Theory

2.1.1.1 Earlier Theories of Speech Act

This speech act theory is developed in the 1960s by a group of British language philosophers and the most important philosopher is J. L. Austin. Speech act theory treats an utterance as an act performed by a speaker in a context with respect to an addressee.

From Austin (1962) research on speech act, he inspires a good deal of research into the various ways a speech utterance might function. Austin is interested in certain utterances that they do not use to give more information, but, he is more interested in utterances that serve as an action. In the book "How To Do Things With Words", Austin set about demolishing that the view of language that will place truth conditions as central to language understanding (Levinson, 1980, p.228). According to Austin in the book of "How To Do Things With Words", he tells his method is like this. He notes that some ordinary language declarative sentences, contrary to logical positivist assumptions, are not apparently used with any intention of making true or false statements. Here is the example, if we hear someone say these sentences below:

(1)   I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow

    I hereby christen this ship the H. M. S. Flounder

    I declare war on Zanzibar

    I apologize

    I promise I'll be there for you

    I object

When we use phrases like *I promise … I apologize …* and *I declare …*, the very act of uttering the sentence is a kind of action. These are as quite different as utterance in which assertions are made. For example, it makes sense for someone to say *No, that's not true* to an assertion such as *it is going to be cold today*, but it makes no sense at all to respond in this manner to a sentence such as *I congratulate you on your award*. Austin classifies three basic senses in which in saying something one is doing something, and hence three kinds of acts that are simultaneously performed; i.e.:

- Locutionary act   : the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference.

- Illocutionary act   : the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc.

  In uttering a sentence, by virtue of the conventional force associated with it (or with its explicit performative paraphrase).

- Perlocutionary act   : it is the effect of the utterance on a listener.

  This may or may not coincide with the illocutionary force; for instance, *I may apologize*, but you may not accept my apology.

An utterance is not something, we use to say things or to give information, but also to do things. It becomes possible to suggest that in uttering any sentence, a speaker could be seen to have performed some act, or to be precise, an illocutionary act. Conventionally associated with each illocutionary act is the force of the utterance which can be expressed as performative such as 'promise' or 'warn'. Performative utterance is an utterance that is used to do something. Therefore, performative utterance is a part of illocutionary act.

2.1.1.2 Performative Utterance Theory

A performative utterance is the utterance that describes the act it performs. There are two conditions that must be fulfilled: (1) it performs a certain act, and (2) at the same time it describes the act. It means that the sentences are not used just to say things, but rather actively to do things.

Examples:

a. *I will do my best*, is performative, because in saying the utterance the speaker actually promises what the utterance describes but *Herman will do his best*, although it describes a promise, is not itself a promise. Thus this utterance does not simultaneously do what it describes; therefore, it is a performative utterance.

b. *I warn you not to make any movement.*

It is a warning that is an utterance to warn someone about something.

c. *I pronounce you husband and wife.*

It is an example of declarations. Usually, it is used in wedding ceremony by a priest.

d. *Today is Monday.*

a, b, and c are the examples of performative utterances, but d is not a performative utterance because it makes an assertion, but it is not performative. According to Searle (in Levinson ,1983), there are just five basic kinds of action that one can perform in speaking, by means of the following five types of utterance, they are representatives, directives, commisives, expressives, and declarations; each of which are identified by their use of performative verbs as underlined as follows:

1. Representatives

Are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker believes to be the case or not such as, *suggest, hint, deny, or swear*.

2. Commisives

Are those kinds of speech acts that speaker use to commit himself to some future action or at some future time (e.g. *I'll do that for you*).

3. Expressives

Express the speaker's feeling about something. This includes *thanks, apologies, concludes, and congratulations*.

4. Declarations

Are expressed in statements, like *I christen this ship the sloop Susie Simms.*

5. Directives

Are those kinds of speech acts that speaker use to get someone else to do something. They express what the speaker wants. They are commands, orders, requests, and suggestions. So the performative verbs are command, order, request, suggest, etc.

There are two general classes of performative utterances that include both **explicit performatives** (the old familiar classes), for example, *I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow* and **implicit performatives**, the latter including lots of other kinds of utterances, if not at all, as in examples:

1. Out!
2. Sixpence.
3. I'll be there at 5 o'clock.

None of these examples contains a performative verb, but (1) can be by a cricket umpire to perform an act of dismissal, (2) by a card-player to make a bet, (3) by anyone to make promise.

2.1.1.3 Felicity Condition Theory

According to Searle theory about the felicity condition, there are certain expected or appropriate circumstances, technically known as **felicity conditions**, for the performance of a speech act to be recognized as intended. For some clear cases, such as *I sentence you to six months in prison,* the performance will be infelicitous (inappropriate) if the speaker is not a specific person in a special context (in this case, a judge in a courtroom).

In everyday contexts among ordinary people, there are also preconditions on speech acts, there are **general conditions** on the participants, for example, that they can understand the language being used and that they are not play-action or being nonsensical. Then there are **content conditions**. For example, for both a promise and warning, the content of the utterance must be about that the future event will be a future act of the speaker.

The **preparatory conditions** for a promise are significantly different from those for a warning. When I promise to do something, there are two preparatory conditions. First, the event will not happen by itself, and second, the event will have a beneficial effect. When I utter a warning, there are the following preparatory conditions: it isn't clear that the hearer knows the event will occur, the speaker does think the event will occur, and the event will not have a beneficial effect. Related to these conditions is the **sincerity conditions** that. For a promise, the speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action, and, for a warning, the speaker genuinely believes that the future event will not have a beneficial effect.

Finally, there is the **essential condition**, which covers the fact that by the act of uttering a promise, I thereby intend to create an obligation to carry out the action as promised. In other words, the utterance changes my state from non-

forming of bad future event to informing. This essential condition thus combines with a specification of what must be in the utterance content, the context, and the speaker's intentions, in order for a specific speech act to be appropriately (felicitously) performed.

Austin (in Levinson, 1983) declares that some sentences, performatives are special: uttering them does things, and does not merely say things (report states of affairs); and performative sentences achieve their corresponding actions because there are specific conventions linking the words to institutional procedures. Performatives are if one likes just rather special sorts of ceremony. And unlike constative, which are assessed in terms of truth and falsity, performative can only be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous, according to weather their felicity conditions are met or not. The writer would operationally apply the concepts of felicity conditions proposed by Searle (1969) as her foundation to found the felicity conditions of the performative utterances of the main characters by analyzing the utterance one by one.

2.2 Review of Related Studies

As related study, the writer reviews one previous study. It is "The Study of Speech Acts in Dawson's Creek TV Serial" by Melda Yap (2001).

Melda Yap conducted a similar study with different subject from this study. She limited her study on the propositional meaning and the illocutionary act while this study will include performative utterances and the felicity conditions as the research subject.

In her study, Melda provides her data in tables. All utterances which are analyzed and categorized by the types of utterance, the propositional meaning and the illocutionary acts can be seen through the provided table. After reading the provided data, the writer found that her study has similarities with this study on speech acts generally and on the classification of types of utterance particularly. She used Searle's theory as her theory to classify the utterances. The phenomenon has encouraged the writer to analyze the performative utterance and the felicity conditions of the conversation by the main characters in A2DC.